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Evaluating Sebastian Rosato's Balance of Power Theory: A Case Study in The Collapse
of Europe's Great Experiment

Tyler Soutendijk
Swarthmore College

Less than two years after World War II, Europe was in shambles. The most monumental
war in world history had forced countries to consolidate all available resources, form precarious
alliances with foreigners, and witness bloodshed in their own backyards. In spite of recent
turmoil, a new military adversary emerged on the world stage that left European powers in
dismay - the Soviet Union. In a memo written in 1946 from the U.S. Joint Intelligence
Committee to Major General Alfred Gruenther: "The USSR [is] the leading military power on
the Eurasian landmass.... None of these countries [are] capable singly of waging a successful
defensive war against the USSR."67 The formidable USSR had both the strongest economy in
Europe, and a military advantage over Britain and France of 6.4:1 and 8.8:1 respectively.68 No
individual nation could impede the Soviet's westward expansion, so neighboring European
countries sought collaboration to counter the USSR threat. Winston Churchill, a luminary of the
previous decade, called for a "United Europe", declaring that "if the people of Europe resolve to
come together and work together for mutual advantage, they still have it in their power to sweep
away the horrors and miseries which surround them."69 As a result, the European Coal and Steel
Community (later tailored into the European Union70) was then formed to balance its collective
capability against the budding titan.
The inception of the European Union follows the framework of Sebastian Rosato’s
Balance of Power Theory. While many balance of power theories exist, this essay will focus on
the variant that Rosato has applied to the E.U. Sebastian Rosato, an Associate Professor of
Political Science at Notre Dame, argues that "Europe's shift from sovereign state system to
67
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supranational community" was for the sole purpose of centralizing power against Soviet
dominance in the region.71 And without a threat of power comparable to the magnitude of the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, member countries within the European Union wouldn't have
integrated into a supranational force. In the post-Cold War Era, Rosato is doubtful of the E.U.'s
future: "Simply put, the European Community’s best days are long gone and there is worse to
come."72 Therefore in years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Rosato predicts that the
E.U. is destined for deliberate fragmentation. In practice, temporary economic prosperity from
E.U. commerce has delayed its collapse, but recent stagnation in growth indicates a vindication
of Rosato's presumption. Balance of Power Theory cannot operate in isolation, but in
conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth, E.U. disintegration is inevitable. This discourse
will affirm Rosato's central claim by synthesizing the principles of Balance of Power Theory as
they are evidenced in historical origins of the E.U., projecting the observable implications we
would expect from integrations of the E.U. following the Cold War Era, and comparing Rosato's
expectations to recent cases in post-war E.U. history. These three explicit components will act as
guiding logic to test the validity of Rosato's assessment and may be extrapolated to provide
insights into the future of the E.U.
Balance of Power Theory rests upon the widely acknowledged framework of the
anarchical system. Under the anarchical system, there is no overarching international authority
capable of setting governing laws or rules that dictate state behavior.73 States cannot know the
intentions of other players within the system and therefore are subject to fear of malevolent
action. Power, as defined by Rosato, refers to "material resources and organizational
effectiveness, which together determine a state's ability to deter or defend against potential
rivals".74 Professor Jack Levy classifies a "great power" as having the "relative self-sufficiency
with respect to military security".75 Member states in the aftermath of WWII lacked power
relative to the indominable USSR and were thus relegated as "minor powers". With the European
continent in ruins, structural instability left their armies and economies vulnerable to external
threats. Individual nations once glorified for the success of previous empires were now worried
that their neighbor would decide to repeat Germany's transgressions.
European leaders knew that westward expansion of the Soviet Union was imminent.
Amidst the veil of war with the Third Reich, the USSR was able to usurp almost all of Eastern
71
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Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and the eastern part of Germany). The Soviets then were
able to continue their expansionist policies following World War II, labeled by Churchill in his
1946 highly publicized speech as the spread of the "iron curtain". Having conquered the East,
Western Europe was the next most likely candidate. The looming threat prompted swift action on
behalf of member states.
Every country in Western Europe shared a common adversary and subsequently a
common threat to national security. Individually, none of these nation-states were capable of
deterring the Soviet threat, but collectively as James Morrow proclaims, "nations form alliances
to increase their security by amassing their capabilities against a common enemy."76
Concentrating the power of sovereign states into a centralized authority would give Europeans
the economic controls needed to accomplish the objective of providing collective security to its
member states. Aligning with the Balance of Power Theory, European nation-states living in the
anarchical system with a superior adversary of the Soviet Union, had no other option under the
pressure of national interests and common intentions than to counterbalance in the manifestation
of a political union. Tony Judt in Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 echoes a similar
viewpoint: "For nations reared within living memory on grandeur and glory, ‘Europe’ would
always be an uncomfortable transition: a compromise, not a choice."77 Therefore because of
systemic fear in the anarchical system, an imminent threat of Soviet westward expansion, and a
shared adversary between Western European countries, the European Union was established.
Formation of the European Union involved deliberation over political, militaristic, and
economic integration. All three of these components required alignment of supranational and
national interests. State actors will support a supranational cause as long as it aligns with their
national interest. A state’s paramount national interest is security that comes in the form of
power in both relative and absolute terms. During Cold War, national interests lined up with
supranational interests because of the common threat to security. After the war, although
collective security was no longer a necessity, temporary economic prosperity (derived from
interstate commerce) kept the E.U. intact. However due to recent macroeconomic decline,
national protectionist interests have gained popularity. In the absence of the Soviet Union, we
would expect to witness gradual disintegration of the European Union, slowed by transient
economic growth. The next section will elaborate on observable implications that can be
expected from Balance of Power Theory following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The European Union, a cooperative instrument of international affairs, was held together
by a shared goal. There was a geostrategic reason to pursue integration and preserve their
76
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existing community. Rosato cites successful political integration in the Cold War Era because
there was a unique circumstance of the "scale and proximity of the Soviet threat."78 The E.U. in
the 1950's needed a centralized union because their collective power was the only means of
deterring the USSR. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the absence of that
geostrategic necessity led to divergent political agendas. Agendas diverged because an
investment of political capital involved surrendering sovereignty in specific areas. These areas of
governance were vital to success of the EU, but came at the expense of national strategic
interests. Hence, according to Balance of Power Theory, we should see a shift of political
disintegration toward a decentralized political union that ensures retained sovereignty of member
states.
The divergence of political agendas should come in the context of two components:
aversion to unification and economic insecurity. First, reluctance to unify in the EU's early years
is a sign of future disinclination. A notorious example of failure to garner collaboration was the
inability to ratify the European Defense Community (EDC) project. This was partially due to the
incumbent presence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), an intergovernmental
military alliance composed of Western European countries and the United States. NATO’s main
purpose was to oppose the Soviet Union militarily in anticipation of a Soviet offensive. The EDC
project also proved too ambitious for countries like France who recently regained sovereignty
and national identity from the death of Stalin.79 Member states questioned the obligation of their
own militaries in the tragedy of preceding decades. The collective gain from a supranational
military alliance, in deference to both the presence of NATO and reluctance to dedicate soldiery,
wasn't enough to form a centralized military. Consequently, in the absence of a Soviet
opposition, we would expect continued aversion to unification.
Second, economic insecurity from a deficient Eurozone structure forecasts a potential
collapse under fiscal pressures. This insecurity can be attributed to the evolution of the European
Coal and Steel Community, a centralized regulatory body for industrial production in Western
Europe.80 Western Europe in World War II needed to devise an economic community in order to
consolidate resources and neutralize Soviet power. Tied to the European ideals of a connected
Europe, the Eurozone (an economic region of countries that have adopted the Euro) served to
encourage free trade and flow of capital. The Eurozone at its zenith had 4.4% GDP growth per
annum with an unemployment rate of 7% in 1988.81 In recent years however, the single market
economy continues to face challenges. Despite a foundation of admirable ideals, "the eurozone
78
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was not structured to accommodate Europe's economic diversity…the structure of the
eurozone…[was] not designed to promote growth, employment and stability."82 The Euro locked
each member state to a fixed exchange rate, delivering one-size-fits-all monetary policy without
considering variance in fiscal discipline. As a result, because the structure of the Eurozone isn't
apt for withstanding fiscal calamity, we would expect the European Union to collapse under
fiscal pressures.
Therefore, it's concluded that divergent political agendas in the absence of a common
threat, and in a context of aversion to unification and economic insecurity, will propel the
disintegration of the E.U. in post-war era. Three cases of evidence for disintegration that will be
discussed in the next section are the Greek government-debt crisis, Brexit, and populist uprisings
in Eastern Europe.
The Greek government-debt crisis made international news when Greece declared in
2009 that its budget deficit would be 12.9% of GDP. While global economies were all
recovering from the 2008 Financial Crisis, the news caused waves throughout the Eurozone.83
Although there is a "one-size-fits-all" monetary policy in the E.U., fiscal policy is reserved to the
respective countries' discretion. As Rosato claims, "fiscal policy [is a] ...source of friction, pitting
members that want to run greater deficits against proponents of tighter fiscal discipline."84 Stalled
macroeconomic growth of the union is driven by the constraint of weak performance from poorer
states on the economic prosperity of wealthier counterparts. Since national interests in post-war
Europe are no longer aligned with supranational cooperation, states would start to question their
obligation to this parasitic union.
One prominent player that decided to give into Euroscepticism was the United Kingdom
in 2016. In a country-wide referendum that earned international news coverage, 52% of the U.K.
population voted for withdrawal from the E.U. The United Kingdom was one of the three
founding actors of the E.U. community, and their attrition signals to the rest of the E.U. that no
member is obligated to remain. Experts have projected that the removal of Britain could lead
other nations to follow suit. Sweden and Denmark, for example, have both rejected handing over
integral powers to the coalition, and right-wing leaders push for a similar referendum.85
Collective movement toward gradual exodus isn’t a positive sign for the future of the European
Union.
Many populist movements within Eastern European countries have borne out of
82
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nationalist interests from migrant influx. These protectionist ideologies have shaped recent
elections in Eastern Europe, and significantly hindered cooperative investment in E.U. policy. A
massive refugee influx into certain regions of the E.U. have caused indigenous workers to feel
their values of nationalism threatened and their jobs at risk. For example, Countries along the
Balkan migration route like Germany and Hungary have pushed back against E.U. immigration
policy and forced delegated migrants to resettle in Turkey.86 The European Union doesn’t have
the authority to enforce settlement of migrants in selected countries. As a result, the
supranational E.U. had to reluctantly accept a E.U.-Turkey migration accord to allow these
member countries to send back refugees. This drawback shows the weakening legitimacy of the
E.U., fueled by ethnocentric attitudes and protectionist ideology.
The Greek government debt-crisis, Brexit, and populist movements in Eastern Europe are
all evidence of disintegration of the European Union. Observable implications from Rosato's
Balance of Power Theory of divergent political agendas in the context of aversion to unification
and economic insecurity have all contributed toward these three cases in E.U. history. However,
temporary economic prosperity following the downfall of the Soviet Union is the only factor that
cannot be explained by Balance of Power Theory. That is why the gradual emergence of stalled
macroeconomic growth from temporary economic prosperity is the cornerstone to slowly
dismantling the E.U. Balance of Power Theory is imperfect and requires this second variable in
order to operate properly. Alongside the necessity of stalled macroeconomic growth, there are
two other stipulations to complete the argument.
Events in recent E.U. politics have affirmed Rosato's presumption, but an important
consideration is that this theory is only derived from the European Union and cannot be
extrapolated to ulterior cases. Hence, the scholar doesn't allow for any replication of this unique
event. Professor Craig Parsons concludes, "the conditions that are supposed to have created it
cannot have been present in other places or at other times."87 The circumstance must consist of: a
series of minor powers within a similar geographical location, all unable to deter the adversary
on their own merit, in a "perfect storm" of desperation, against an external threat of incredible
magnitude. These criterion leave limited room to contest the theory in civil debate.
Sebastian Rosato’s Balance of Power Theory is also one of many International Relations
models that scholars have applied to explain the origination of the E.U. An alternate model that
Rosato mentions to explain interstate cooperation of the E.U. is the community model88 known
as ideational entrepreneurship. In contrast to Rosato's balance of power argument, the ideational
86
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entrepreneurship approach holds that integration cannot solely be understood as an objective
response to geopolitical or economic imperatives. European integration was driven because
leaders with "pro-community" ideas came into power in France and Germany.89 Nonetheless,
Rosato sees a flaw in this causal logic by citing that there is scant evidence that prominent
political figures subscribed to this reasoning.
The European Union is considered by many to be the "most extraordinary experiment in
the history of political institutions."90 In the period of post-WWII Europe, it was revered as the
glue that would bring peace and prosperity to the continent. The E.U. was a beacon of hope for
European nations that had lost their fortuitous power in previous decades. Sebastian Rosato's
Balance of Power Theory successfully explains the formation of this union, and in conjunction
with stalled macroeconomic growth following a period of economic prosperity, it's inevitable
demise. Anticipating the aforementioned disintegration, scholars believe there are five
fundamental challenges that face the E.U.: overexpansion, the collapse of the Soviet Empire (inline with Rosato's theory), the euro crisis, a deteriorating regional environment, and the
persistence of nationalism.91 All five of these tribulations will not be easy to overcome given the
current political climate. According to Rosato, the European Union must either face an adversary
comparable to the Soviet Union or be destined to a slow demise. In the dynamic international
system, International Relations theorists can never be confident in definitive predictions. We can
conclude by Rosato’s logic in conjunction with stalled macroeconomic growth, and borne out in
evidence by recent E.U. politics, that the European Union will inevitably dismantle. Although
the European goal of an "even closer union" is unlikely, this is not to say that the European states
will stop cooperating with each other.92 The E.U. has been successful in linking neighboring
nations in the socio-cultural emergence of a common European identity. Even as the E.U.'s
power wanes, it will always be remembered as a remarkable political achievement that has
fostered the core of European exceptionalism.
In many ways the E.U. has set the standard for a model liberal institution. The idea of a
failing E.U. has serious implications for our perspective of global order. If global order is
composed of a multiplicity of independent state actors, and liberal institutions made up of these
actors aren’t surviving over time, then the future of the global order may be an attrition of
supranational institutions. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, World
Bank, and World Health Organization all rest upon the same principle of cooperative action to
solve dilemmas beyond the capacity of an individual nation. Does this imply that there’s an
89
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overarching decline in interstate cooperation? The rise of protectionist movements challenging
incumbent governments may indicate warning signs of this phenomena. Without interstate
cooperation as the cornerstone of the international system, global order will cease to operate. A
network of distrust between actors in the system will impede any collective action. Collective
action amongst nations functions to regulate economies, prevent wars, and aid humanitarian
crises. The self-serving mentality of fixating on national interests will dismantle the fabric of
global community. Looking forward, we must continue to bridge cultural boundaries through the
diaspora of globalization. The global order is comprised of generations capable of igniting
political change. One liberal institution doesn’t have to determine the future course of global
order. The European Union may collapse, but there’s still hope in the establishment.
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